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This paper seeks to present a study of local structures through which global circumstances are 
negotiated. In particular I look at role of the mass media in the transformation of political signifi�
cances in a Palestinian village on the West Bank from the local to the global, and the relation of 
those media to the articulation and negotiation of the relation between these different levels. I 
have argued elsewhere��aim ����, ����, ����a, ����b, �����that if we are to understand the so�
cial and cultural implications of the integration of the whole planet into a single global system we 
must study the local level and the relations between it and the others. The local level is particu�
larly important as it is the level at which action takes place, and it is through action that�social 
and cultural�structure is connected to�physical, geographical, technological, or other�circum�
stance. Without understanding this relation at the local level between structure and circumstance 
we cannot understand social and cultural change or continuity, diversity, or convergence at that 
level or the others. This study takes as its ethnographic focus concerns the village of Tustas�not 
the village’s real name�，which is a Palestinian village on the West Bank, nestled in the Judean hills 
overlooking the Palestinian plain. It is a mixed Christian and Muslim village with a total resident 
population of approximately �,���, about two thirds of which is Christian and one third Muslim.
Palestinians have been involved in a variety of transformative actions over a long period. Among 
those, the first Palestinian uprising�intifada�was not only a pivotal practical moment in the trans�
formation of the territories as a whole and of Tustas but was also a critical theoretical one. The 
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mass media were central to this. In reporting on and representing the uprising and the actions of 
Palestinians in it, the mass media had a far-reaching impact in changing what is taken as authori�
tative knowledge and‘facts’， in Tustas, Palestine, and more widely. They gave Tustasis, and Pal�
estinians more generally, a sense of Palestinian actions and the power of their actions. They were 
thus importantly involved in the construction, by Palestinians, of Palestinian action in the world 
and, through this, of Palestinian identity.
This is sharply at odds with the approach and conclusions of Edward Said�����, ����, ����, ����, 
����, ����, ���4, �����．However, my approach, which brings together circumstances, structures, 
dispositions, and subjective actions, has greater explanatory force than that of Said when con�
fronted, for example, with general phenomena such as Palestinians’‘use’of the mass media in 
their struggle. It also allows better understanding of local phenomena and details such as the 
changes in notions of authoritative knowledge which are occurring in Tustas, or the relation be�
tween the various structures, circumstances, and actions, such as symbolic geography, logics of 
relatedness, religious, political, and other affiliations, changed economic, communications, and edu�
cational circumstances, and changed notions of authority and knowledge.
The intifada both was and still is understood by many of those who participated in it as a con�
struction of Palestinian identity through action in the world. However, an individual’s field of di�
rect experience in relation to a movement that was as large and widespread as the intifada must 
be limited. Therefore, given Tustasis’exposure to the mass media, their awareness of Palestinian 
action�in the intifada or elsewhere�，and thus their sense of that action, must be critically in� u�
enced by reportage and presentation of it in the media.
In conjunction with mass education the mass media have produced a situation in which the au�
thority-value of knowledge among older and uneducated inhabitants of Tustas differs from that 
among the youth. The former take their own experiences and those of their relatives and friends 
as the main referents for their views of everything from how to protect crops from the depreda�
tions of pests to the meaning of the unrest or the current peace process. Younger inhabitants are 
more inclined to accept the overriding of conclusions based on their own experience by declara�
tions or disquisitions from authoritative sources. Those of natural scientists, intellectuals, and edu�
cated people generally,‘experts’， and reports in the written or electronic media are particularly 
accepted and valued. For many people the primacy of personal experience in creating one’s own 
view of the world is being compromised, and perhaps ultimately will be supplanted, to a greater 
or lesser extent, by the personal experience of exposure to‘pictures of the world’presented by 
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the media. The intellectually inclined�subjected to the same revolution in thought that the West 
has undergone since the time of Bacon�learn to accept the pronouncements of‘scientists’and
‘experts’even when these may contradict their own experience. 
Local Structures of Communication
Despite integration into the world economy, and the associated development of modern communi�
cations and education infrastructures some important communal and local networks and struc�
tures of communication have been retained. This supports, in part, the findings of Shinar������
that such networks are as viable as the mass media in performing communicative functions. He 
argues that they constitute“communications systems analogous to the mass media”and are“easi�
ly available, highly credible, reasonably �exible, pervasive, and organically integrated into society”
�Shinar ����：����. However, although such apparently‘local’structures remain in place in Tus�
tas they are not localised in the same way as when the village and its environs were the socially 
and politically significant world of the inhabitants. The movement of political and economic signif�
icance from the‘locality’to the‘region’or‘nation’of Palestine has led to formerly localised 
structures exerting in�uence through connection to wider organisations and structures of authority 
and knowledge.‘Local’structures are no longer‘localised.’Though still used for local purposes, 
they have also been caught in the movement to wider authority and knowledge structures and 
have been harnessed to those wider structures’purposes.
The mosque provides a particularly clear example of this. Announcements of local and communal 
interest continue to be made through local and communal channels. For example, Muslims an�
nounce forthcoming weddings in their mosque and Christians in their churches. Announcements 
are also made at the village’s various guesthouses, which then take it on themselves to inform 
their members. When a Muslim dies, the loudspeakers of the mosque, which can be heard across 
the village, are used to broadcast the news of the death and details of when the funeral and buri�
al will take place. When a Christian dies church bells are rung so that all know that a death has 
occurred. The time of burial may then be ascertained by hearsay. In addition to this the bells are 
rung again shortly before the funeral service is to take place.
The loudspeakers of the mosque and the bells of the churches are also used to rally the villagers, 
as was done, for example, when Israeli settlers attacked the village during one of my visits.
The loudspeakers of the mosque are also used to broadcast announcements of general interest to 
the village. For example, when health workers came to the village to open a clinic for the day, an 
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announcement to that effect was made over the loudspeakers. Such use of the loudspeakers to 
broadcast messages of cross-confessional interest to the whole village is accepted by both confes�
sions, so much so that the Christians have not felt any need to establish an alternative method of 
cross-confessional news dissemination. Indeed, apart from setting up their own loudspeakers, 
nothing else would be as effective. Of course, the Muslims also use the loudspeakers for their own 
communal announcements. These are all clearly local uses and purposes.
However, all the key personnel controlling the mosque belong to the Muslim Brothers�MB�．Fi�
nally, they control use of the mosque as an instrument of communication. They control access to 
the loudspeakers. They also determine who is invited to lead prayers or address the congregation. 
These last two are both very important political functions as they allow the imam, or speaker, 
largely to set the agenda for the gathering. The social importance of the mosque and its preach�
ers is due, in large part, to the activities of the MB, an organisation having its base of authority 
and knowledge outside the village. The integration of the mosque and its communicative activities 
into wider structures is well developed and strong：guest speakers are brought in by the MB as 
frequently as once a month to address the congregation on topical issues, and video tapes from 
MB organisations in other countries are regularly brought in and screened in the mosque itself.
The importance of wider non-local knowledge-authority was succinctly expressed in one of the 
videos that I watched in company with the usual congregation. The subject of the video was a 
debate between a famous American television evangelist and a similarly well-known MB sheikh 
from Egypt. The video was made in Saudi Arabia. In it the alleged power of Islamic rationality to 
overcome its perceived greatest challenge�Western Christianity�was‘demonstrated’for the au�
dience by the sheikh’s manoeuvring of the evangelist to agree that certain parts of the Bible 
might not be appropriate reading for the latter’s wife or daughter because of their references to 
sex. This was contrasted with the Qur’an, all of which the sheikh declared fit for his wife and 
daughters to read. The absence of‘impure’passages was taken as affirming the unquestionable 
truth of the Qur’an as God’s unaltered Word�in contrast to their presence in the Bible, which 
was taken thereby as adulterated and therefore untrue�，and by implication to confirm the MB 
as a group committed to the expression of that Word in the re-organisation of society. Authority 
for the MB was thus derived from the cosmic level. This relied on the logic in Islam that defines 
the Qur’an as the only unaltered expression of God’s Word revealed to humanity and, thus, the 
only true revelation. Practically, too, the nature of the debate as between an American Christian 
and an Egyptian Muslim Brother, with the video itself made by the MB in Saudi Arabia, indicates 
the encompassment of‘local’structures by wider ones from which connection authority is drawn.
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Within the specific area of the village, the in�uence of communal leaders through the mosque, 
preachers, and religious bodies�such as the MB�is demonstrated most dramatically by two of 
the villagers’responses to the attack by Israeli settlers. Firstly, at the time of the attack the calls 
to assemble females and children in the mosque�made by a known Muslim Brother�，and the 
wide Muslim compliance with these calls, in contrast to the Christians’individualistic and critical 
reactions, illustrate this point. Secondly, the in�uence of MB-Hamas operatives in controlling the 
Muslim youth after the incident and the absence of subsequent actions to provoke the Israelis also 
indicate the in�uence of those operatives and their religiously-oriented modes of communication.
Regardless of the viability of religious and communal networks as modes of communication and 
their integration into wider knowledge-authority structures, mobilisation of the populace would 
be very difficult if not impossible, without system. Shinar noted that among Muslims, the Su�
preme Muslim Council was one of the few country-wide organisations operating legally on the 
West Bank under occupation. This allowed it to maintain communication with a wide audience at 
all times：lea�ets and declarations were distributed during and after prayers；texts were read in 
mosques, printed in the Palestinian press, and relayed on Jordanian television；and the Council 
sponsored classes on religious matters�Shinar ����：���．Institutionally, three main features en�
hance the effectiveness, persuasiveness, and relevance of such religious networks. These are their 
possession of centralised organisation with clear lines of control and channels accessible to wide 
audiences； authoritative, well-defined, and uncomplicated messages relevant to the cognitive, 
emotional, and integrative needs of the populace；and strong institutional links throughout society
�Shinar ����：���．These qualities maintain the predisposition of audiences to use religious net�
works. This happens in Tustas, at least among Muslims. The politically and religiously dominant 
MB-Hamas exhibits these features, which help shape a disposition of Tustasi Muslims to accept 
social and political integration, given a religious gloss and expressed through the religious net�
work��aim ���4�．Local Christians, however, are characterised by denominational division, exac�
erbated by the in�uence of other forces. This lessens the very possibility of a central and inte�
grating religious network such as the Muslims enjoy.
The Electronic Mass Media
Externally generated electricity did not come to Tustas until ����. There had been some electric�
ity before that, from the beginning of the ����s, as a Christian community project. An interna�
tional Christian group provided eight generators which supplied power to the Christian communi�
ty. However, since ���� electricity has been available throughout the village. Wired electricity 
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was, of course, necessary for the spread of television to each house, though battery operated radi�
os predated it.
The British administration gave the first radio to the Muslim mukhtar of the village in about 
��4�, to assist in the spread of propaganda for the war effort. The radio was well received by the 
villagers and large groups used to congregate to listen to it. More radios entered the village in 
the Jordanian period. During the Israeli period they became truly ubiquitous. The first television 
did not arrive until ���� when a Christian family bought one privately. More were bought after 
this, and once electricity was laid onto the village in ���� the television became one of the most 
common appliances to be found in village homes. The only houses which do not have sets are 
those of two refugees struggling to make ends meet and who, incidentally, live in the only houses 
which do not have electricity connected.
Relation to the Mass Media
This saturation of the village with both radios and televisions, together with a dearth of newspa�
pers�which only come to the village if bought elsewhere and brought back�，ensures that it is 
the first two that exercise greater in�uence on the people and their pictures of the world. Radio 
is the most convenient medium by which the populace gets most of its news. Television is impor�
tant for a different reason, namely, for the narrative images that it provides. Narrative images 
from television, by their combination of visual dynamism and auditory input have a greater and 
more immediate impact on viewers than those of other media�. This plays a part in, but is also 
accentuated by, the relatively greater penetration of the village by television than by radio and 
the printed media. The majority of villagers give the narrative images provided by television or 
video a credence second to none, while reports from other media are subject to confirmation or 
refutation by filmed reports�.
Television provides powerful pictures of Palestinian unrest and circumstances, and of disasters 
and unrest elsewhere in the world. Through these pictures villagers in Tustas compare, however 
superficially, their situation with that in other countries. They generally return to the view that 
Palestinians suffer more than anyone else. During the uprising, electronic images had a role in the 
self-identification of Palestinian viewers as suffering. They also provided a vision of what it was 
that they were suffering. They thus formed narrative images. They‘showed’the necessity of vi�
�　The Internet and social media mobilization remain relatively limited due to unreliable electricity 
supply and reception difficulties in this rugged area.
�　This preference for filmed reporting is not confined to Palestinians by any means.
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olence and demonstrations and reinforced the idea of Palestinians being a powerless and op�
pressed people, which in turn was used to justify their struggle. In a very general sense the pic�
tures of struggles elsewhere provided a base for a superficial idea of the universality of their own 
struggle as one of oppressed people everywhere.
However, the mass of the villagers� thought the Palestinian struggle to be especially severe：more 
so than struggles anywhere else are on the people involved. Comparisons made between demon�
strations in South �orea and the Palestinian uprising are an example of this. In the early months 
of the intifada a series of demonstrations by South �orean students occurred and were reported 
in the television news on the West Bank. Sometimes these reports were broadcast immediately 
before or after reports of that day’s intifada-related activities. The ferocity of the actions of both 
the �orean students and police was acknowledged by villagers of both confessions and all age and 
educational groups. However, this was done only to the end that it could be argued that the Israe�
li state was even more repressive than its South �orean counterpart4. Similarly, the current up�
rising in Syria and the previous uprisings in Tunisia and Libya as opposed to the‘failure’of civil 
unrest against Israel are also interpreted in a similar way. Indeed, the success of the uprising in 
Libya is perversely seen as confirming the allegedly more repressive nature of the Israeli state.
Such reports were used to emphasise the posited greater repression endured by the Palestinians 
and hence their particular right to physical protest. The notion that repression by the State justi�
fied such protest was also used to deny that the intifada was an act of violence�’unf�．The Israeli 
State was defined as particularly repressive and so unjust. Thus, its actions were characterised 
by the villagers as violent and terroristic�irhābi�．The perceived justice of the Palestinians’pro�
test in the face of an unjust and repressive regime was used to legitimate the use of physical 
force against that regime and its sympathisers. The particular use of force that developed was 
thus rendered as‘uprising’and not‘violence’．
Whatever else the villagers tune to on the radio or television all attend to the news programmes 
each day. This creates a high level of exposure to foreign news reports, so that it is not surpris�
ing that the villagers are very conscious of the news media as such. That is to say, they are con�
scious of the media transmitting images and information which people use as a basis on which to 
form views of the Palestinian problem. More than this, through foreign news reports they have 
�　Apart from the Communists, who argued that the Palestinian struggle was one of a third world 
people against capitalist imperialism.
4　See also Hunter������
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become very aware of the images of Palestinians and Palestine that are presented and through 
which they perceive foreigners formulate many of their views of them and their struggle. The 
images of Palestinians that foreigners receive were of especial importance to Tustasis. Among 
people of all confessions, educational levels and age groups there was a widespread concern that 
Palestinians were often seen as practitioners of politically-motivated violence and that this might 
lessen the willingness of outsiders to understand their situation or to press for its resolution. On 
numerous occasions a wide range of people, from, for example, an old woman lacking the most 
rudimentary schooling to adolescents of both confessions, charged me with the responsibility that, 
having seen that the Palestinians“are not all terrorists”�as outsiders may have come to see 
them to be�but are rather“normal people trying to live their lives in peace,”I should communi�
cate this to people in the West. Connected to this was another concern, again expressed across 
the whole spectrum of people in Tustas, that I should record detailed information about the dem�
onstrations, demands, and activities of the Palestinians making up the intifada as well as the ac�
tions, both official and unofficial, of the Israelis in trying to put it down. I should then tell people in 
the outside world about it. These two related concerns and investments in my research indicate 
a wide spread belief in the power of reportage to in�uence international opinion, and faith in the 
ability of such opinion to assist in improving the situation in the occupied territories and, ulti�
mately, in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian con�ict itself. In short, these villagers feel a need to 
get international support and see both media coverage and private reportage as effective in form�
ing public opinion overseas, and so gaining that support.
From this consciousness of the media it is but a short step to another view, commonly expressed 
both inside and outside the village at the time, that the importance of the uprising itself lay in the 
effect it had in focussing international attention on the Israeli-Palestinian problem. The uprising 
was seen as important in allowing Palestinians to gain international support by showing their 
common humanity and by appealing to international ideologies such as liberty and national self-
determination. The audience being targeted was international. Coverage of the uprising“gives 
the world a view of Palestinians and shows that we are people whose humanity is not less than 
that of other people and that all we want is to claim our freedom.”Just as the rolling strikes of 
the intifada were intended to disrupt the Israeli economy, demonstrations and civil unrest were 
intended to remind both the Israeli and international publics that the problem remained acute. To 
quote Isma’īl,
　　 the demonstrations are to show the outside world that the Palestinians can act with one 
mind, and to remind the world, which had begun to concentrate on other issues, such as the 
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war between Iran and Iraq, that we are still here and that the problem remains unsolved.
The primary importance of the uprising for these people was not as an attempt directly to topple 
Israeli structures of control in the territories but to put the plight of the Palestinians in the terri�
tories before the people of the world and to ensure that the world’s attention did not stray onto
‘other issues’．It was widely thought that demonstrations and throwing stones in and of them�
selves could neither threaten the Israeli state nor force it to make concessions. Of course, they 
were intended to increase the economic cost to Israel of continuing the occupation, but their 
greater value was measured by the extent to which they mobilised international pressure which 
could force Israel to negotiate. In order to achieve its goals the uprising needed, and was seen to 
need, an international audience and‘witness’．This could only be achieved through the reportage 
of the mass media. Because of this strikes of Arab shops which prevented Palestinians from buy�
ing even their necessities were deemed useful because,“by keeping the shops shut a signal is 
sent to the Israelis and especially to the outside world that the problem has not been solved and 
we are still here. This will, in turn, keep the pressure on Israel from the outside.”� Or, as a mid�
dle-aged teacher, who described himself as an educator non-partisan and apolitical, argued,
“though the strikes may appear to hurt the Arabs [sic] more than the Jews [sic] because the Jew�
ish [sic] shops and factories remain open, the reason for them is to cause the international and 
world community to study the problem and to try to do something.”
The taken for granted nature of belief in the value and utility of using the mass media to commu�
nicate with the wider world as well as belief in the power of international pressure to achieve 
progress and a solution to the problem indicate a transformation of the villagers’systems of po�
litical significance occurring through the Palestinians’relation to the media and not in spite of it6. 
This is further brought out in the most common charge made against the Israelis：that they are 
or act like the Nazis, or even worse.
The villagers were well aware that when‘the world’was confronted with the inhumanity of the 
Nazis’treatment of the Jews this was of instrumental benefit to the case for the establishment of 
Israel. Villagers’sources of this information are varied. Several times when visiting friends�both 
Muslim and Christian�I found them attentively watching programmes on Israeli television deal�
ing with the Nazis’persecution of the Jews. Even illiterate villagers have become familiar with 
�　Abū Badr, of the Ghazal, in conversation, noted later.
6　This is connected to the transformation occurring through the changed nature of communications, 
the altered nature of the economy�discussed in �aim �����， and developments in education.
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narrative images of both the Nazis and their treatment of the Jews through such programmes 
and could‘explain’to me what was happening in case I should not understand. High school pu�
pils were well-informed about this subject through their classes in history. Articles on this and 
related subjects appear in the Arabic print media. Finally, each of the political groups in the vil�
lage�the MB-Hamas, Fatah, the Communists, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
�PFLP�，and Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine�DFLP��take it on themselves to 
equip their members with the ability to argue their respective cases. This requires that members 
be able to address the question of whether the Nazi persecution justifies the establishment of the 
State of Israel in Palestine. A further issue is whether there are parallels between the position of 
the Jews under the Nazis and the Palestinians under the Israelis. These are important questions 
in political discussions among the villagers. By using an historical example so important in the 
campaign to establish Israel in order to characterise the Palestinians’position under Israel, the vil�
lagers are able to claim a moral equivalence between the two. This moral equivalence is ex�
pressed in terms of global discourses of human rights；discourses which themselves rose to such 
prominence in the wake of the events of the Second World War�.
It was common, then, for villagers to say to each other, and for me to be told by them, that“the 
Jews are worse than the Nazis and kill young women and children；”Israel“is worse than a Fas�
cist state；”“they are the new Nazis；”or, as one informant interestingly queried,“have you 
heard about Hitler? They are worse than Hitler.”Both education and the mass media provide 
such categories for the people to use in their perception of events and their use indicates that a
‘global’vocabulary, common around the world, is used in this role. It should be stressed, howev�
er, that not all the informants who use such a vocabulary are necessarily conscious of the dis�
course from which it comes or knowledgeable of the events to which it refers. Many, particularly 
among the middle aged, have no developed idea of how the Israelis are like the Nazis but merely 
know that the Nazis and Fascists are associated with repression and the denial of human rights, 
and do not develop their ideas or understanding beyond that. Thus one young male Muslim infor�
mant could say that the Israelis are worse than the Nazis because women and children had been 
�　The invocation of the Nazis to describe and condemn the treatment of Palestinians by Israelis is 
one of a number of interesting‘re�ections’of Jewish and Israeli discourses of self-understanding. 
Other parallels are the notion of being a dispersed people and the desire to‘return.’Such apparent
‘mirroring’deserves detailed study. However, to include such a study here would not be practicable. 
I therefore limit myself to mentioning it and suggesting it as deserving attention in the future. What 
is important for the current discussion is what it indicates about the transformation of the political 
significances with which the villagers work, from the local�during the Ottoman period�to the global 
�as is currently the case�．
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killed during the intifada, though of course the Nazis systematically killed large numbers of wom�
en and children. Similarly, while watching an Israeli television news report in which Palestinian 
youths sat blindfolded with their hands bound in front of their bodies, my co-viewers could ejacu�
late,“Look! Look at what they do! They are worse than the Nazis. The Nazis never did such 
things!”
The younger generations, who have had a more comprehensive education than their elders�who 
actually lived through the Second World War�，display a greater knowledge of the Nazis. So fa�
miliar are they with this aspect of history that several of this literate generation, having been 
taught history in school, were able to present me with the revisionist arguments that the death 
camps did not exist and that stories of Nazi persecution of the Jews were part of a Zionist con�
spiracy, or that“only”6 ��� Jews were killed, not six million, and did so as competently as any 
such revisionists living in the West. Also of interest in regard to the in�uence of global discours�
es, the media, and the internalisation of this aspect of world and Jewish history was a graffito ap�
pearing in the village：“ new ”．Signifi cantly, this graffi  to was written in the‘global’and‘me�
dia’language, namely English, together with symbols apprehensible around the world. This 
contrasts with the mass of graffiti which came to cover walls in the village as the uprising contin�
ued, which were in Arabic.
This transformation of significances from the local to the global is, in this case, primarily political. 
At no time did members of the USA-based evangelical Protestant Church of God, established in 
the village by expatriate missionaries after the ��6� war, use the rhetoric of the equivalence of 
Nazism and the practices of the State of Israel in discussion among themselves, with other villag�
ers, or with me. The significance of the actions of the Israeli state for this congregation was pre�
dominantly religious and chiliastic, and their significances and idiom quite different.
The other Christians’and the Muslims’logics of collectivity and engagement in action in the 
world predispose them to draw relevances with politically mobilising force. The evangelical Prot�
estants have a particular logic of individualism which predisposed them to a quietistic millenari�
anism��aim ����：���-�4��．The oppression of the Jews by the Nazis followed by the establish�
ment of the State of Israel is, for them, a‘sign’of�literally�eschatological importance：it is a 
sign of God’s covenant with the Jews and the imminence of the Apocalypse. It was in these terms 
that it excited them and in which they referred to it. It was not used to mobilise members of that 
Church to political activism, but to reinforcement of their faith, and anticipation of Judgement and 
personal salvation. Not surprisingly, then, the evangelical Protestants did not make the same con�
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nections as their Muslim, Catholic, and Orthodox co-villagers. Indeed the logic of their particular 
individualism positively militates against the drawing of such significances. They draw religious 
parallels；the rest of the village draws political ones. From this difference antagonism grows：this 
is the logical basis of the regular denouncements of the Church of God as Zionist by politically ac�
tive Muslims and Christians, and provides a further example of the in�uence of cultural logics on 
the constitution of significance.
Through the evangelical Protestants’religious predisposition, local and global�indeed, universal�
foci both are obliterated because the universal is immediately significant on the personal level. 
God is everywhere and immanent in us all. For the Muslims and the majority of Christians the 
distinction between local and global is acute�though phrased in terms of a literate/non-literate 
distinction�and forms an important part of the political supersession of the traditional elders and 
the rise of the youth. The distinction is important because it allows the shift of political domi�
nance from one generation to another, and from one type of knowledge to another, to be under�
stood and to be made meaningful. It makes youth leadership in the intifada appropriate, even to 
those elders who lament their generation’s loss of dominance. New circumstances are recognised 
to require new methods. The notion of change itself is basic. The Protestants’apolitical religiosity
�in contrast to the Muslims’engagement of politics with religion and the Christian majority’s a-
religious politicality�does not require such a notion of change.
The media,�particularly television and the narrative images taken from it�were thus important 
not simply for conveying messages to an international audience and eliciting support from it. 
They also provided tools by which Palestinians themselves fashioned their own understanding of 
the uprising. They did so on the basic level of what was reported as having happened, and when, 
where, and how it happened. They also provided material through which the actors invested 
their understanding and knowledge of the uprising and the uprising itself with meaning. More 
fundamentally, they have been instrumental in shifting political significances from the local knowl�
edge of previous centuries to the wider knowledge on which the youth currently rely. In this way 
they play a part in the further reduction of the elders�and their knowledge�to irrelevance, and 
in the increasing�political�relevance of the youth. They thus play a part in making Palestinian 
history. This is achieved through Palestinians being able to deal appropriatively with the media 
and their products. It is basic to my theoretical position and analytical approach that this should 
be so. However, this brings us into direct disagreement with the position and interpretation of 
perhaps the most in�uential commentator on the Palestinian problem, Edward Said. The reasons 
for this disagreement are both basic and important.
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The Media：appropriating, appropriated, or both?
The uprising and its relation to the media are of import if we are to understand both the uprising 
and reportage of it. It draws into question the relation between events and the representation of 
events. More specific to this study, the uprising also draws into question the relation of the mass 
media to political actions and structures, and thus to notions of domination and coercion.
I have argued that the Palestinians actively involved media reportage of their action in their own 
political project. This I demonstrated to be done in two ways. Firstly, the media were‘used’to 
transmit the uprising to the world in order to in�uence international public opinion to demand ac�
tion on the Palestinians’behalf. Secondly, the media, together with other aspects of modern com�
munications, form sources of knowledge and information from the wider world. Palestinians may 
use this knowledge for their own purposes.
Within Tustas knowledge and information gained from such‘wider’sources are used to further 
weaken the political role of‘local’knowledge. This entails a movement of political power among 
Palestinians themselves, to assist national mobilisation and struggle. I have suggested that the 
mass media have a role in the transformation of Palestinian political relevances and authoritative 
knowledge, and that the Palestinians’ active relation to the media is integral to this. I have there�
fore argued that the Palestinians have dealt appropriatively with the media and their representations 
of events. Edward Said argues that the media and their representations in fact drastically restrict 
the ability of Palestinians�and other non-Westerners�to so deal with‘reality.’�
When the uprising began one idea that united Palestinians�regardless of social class, educational 
level, or political persuasion�was that the intifada had brought the Palestinian question back to 
the attention of the world. Previously, the Arabs had down-graded its consideration at the Am�
man summit of ���� and the world at large had concentrated on the Iran-Iraq war, among other 
issues. Indeed, writers such as Siniora������see the relegation of the Palestinian problem as a 
trigger for the uprising itself. This is not surprising in view of the connection of the media to 
changes in the villagers’modes of interpretation, discussed above. Among Palestinians, in the ter�
ritories especially, the intifada increased their national pride. This was partly because they saw 
�　Though this issue also relates to questions of power and knowledge raised by‘post-modernists’
the way in which I have phrased it here more critically affects my general argument. Here, there�
fore, I shall concentrate on Said’s critique of‘Orientalism’．That critique informs his writing on the 
Palestinians, the Israeli-Palestinian problem more generally, and his criticism of the media and its 
coverage of the Middle East and Palestinians in particular.
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themselves as unarmed Palestinians who“transformed the image of the Palestinians in the inter�
national community, and placed Israel in the most difficult dilemma of its forty-year existence”
��uttab ����：4��．Not for these participants the idea that they had been rendered silent. Rather 
the global media were crucial to their vocality as it is through them that narrative images of both 
Palestinian struggle and Israeli brutality were transmitted to the international community�.
Reports of the intifada by the same media companies and networks that service the bulk of the 
Western world, helped create a new self-confidence among the populace. This is the second mo�
ment of the Palestinians’relation to the media, in which the latter are used for Palestinian mobili�
sation. This new self-confidence is part of what I have referred to as Palestinians gaining a sense 
of their actions and of the power of those actions, through the media and not in spite of them, as 
Said would have it. Palestinians and their sympathisers elsewhere�for example, see Seddon �����
have said very clearly that through this act of‘making history’a return to the pre-existing situ�
ation is not possible. Arguably, without the intifada the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the oc�
cupied territories and moves towards Palestinian self-rule would not have occurred. Nor, it is 
true, is a return to the previous situation possible. History has truly been made by Palestinians 
for themselves and for the wider region, and so for the wider world.
What is important is that this new self-confidence is related to the reporting of aspects of the up�
rising by the media and the interpretation of such reported aspects by Palestinians themselves. 
Furthermore, a number of developments have shown that Palestinians can in�uence opinion and 
political agendas around the world through the media, and that the villagers’faith is not misguid�
ed. These are：
　　�a� the United Nations’Security Council resolution of early ���� on the Palestinian-Israeli 
con�ict；
　　�b�Jordan’s renunciation of claims to the West Bank；
　　�c�the United States’commencement of talks with the PLO；
　　�d�the peace negotiations sponsored by the United Sates；
　　�e� a movement of opinion in the West to favour settlement and realisation of Palestinian 
rights�cf. Nassar and Heacock ����：����；and,
　　�f� the achievement of limited self rule by the Palestinians and the withdrawal of Israeli forc�
es from the territories.
�　The media are also integral to Palestinians’vocality through the narrative images transmitted to 
Palestinians themselves and which the latter appropriate to develop their own understandings and 
significances, and, indeed, their own mobilisation, as discussed earlier.
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Of course, the final results of such attention and awareness depend on the further practice of ac�
tors�both in the territories and outside them�，in�uenced by the structures in which they are 
situated and the circumstances that they face at that time. They do not depend on media report�
age alone, or even mainly�as is also the case in the West���. Palestinians, constructed by Said in 
particular, as a non-western�and so mute�‘object’of the media, in fact can, and do, use those 
same media to deal with reality appropriatively. In this sense the Palestinians are‘making history.’
However, it is not only‘their’history that they are making. It is‘ours’also.
This is the significance of the historicity of local structures, dispositions and actions, even in con�
frontation with world-encircling structures�which, of course, have their own dispositions�．This 
is why the crisis involving Tustas is conjunctive and not simply penetrative. It is the wider con�
junction of changing circumstances and the penetration of wider structures such as the media, 
with and into local structures and dispositions that is the seat of this historical transformation. Al�
though Said claims to oppose“universalising”‘world history’his analyses actually neglect the 
historicity of local structures and dispositions and their own potential for historical re-definition 
in conjunction with wider, more powerful structures. In arguing this I do not take up“Orientalism’s 
political origin and its continuing political actuality”�Said ����：��．For Said, it is because of this 
actuality that“we are obliged on intellectual as well as political grounds to investigate the resis�
tance to the politics of Orientalism”�Said ����：��．Equally, however, we should investigate the 
political grounds of Said’s resistance to criticism of his critique of Orientalism. In that resistance it is his 
oversight�or is it denial?�of the ideological, methodological, and political similarities between his 
construction of Orientalism and the Orientalists’constructions of the Orient that is the founda�
tion of the‘inconsistency’with which he views himself as superficially accused. The accusation 
of inconsistency is not, however, superficial.
Said’s intellectual confusion over the relation between ideas and material reality has rightly been 
criticised elsewhere��. This is apparent when we consider, in the light of his overall criticism of 
Western discursive coercion, his championing of Palestinian resistance. He says that Palestinian 
resistance to domination by the Zionist viewpoint in the West has caused that viewpoint to be di�
minishes and restrained�Said and Hitchens ����：�-��．He also argues that Zionism has come 
under increasing attack due to Palestinians contesting it�Said and Hitchens ����：���and that 
the intifada was“one of the great anti-colonial uprisings of our times”�Said ����：����．I have 
��　This international attention itself is based on heteroglossia, multivocality, or dialogue�to use the 
jargon of‘post-modernists’�．
��　See, for example, Graham-Brown������，Turner����4�
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already mentioned these things as happening. They do not challenge my view of power and 
knowledge；rather, they support it. Their implications for Said’s view of‘Orientals’and especial�
ly Palestinians as the dominated victims of oppressive discourses are not so benign, however. 
Said does further damage to his own case when asserting that he follows C. Wright Mills’insight 
that‘‘No man stands alone directly confronting a world of solid fact. No such world is avail�
able...’’�quoted in Said ����：4��．This, in spite of earlier asserting that“an extremely important 
distinction to be made between American and European awareness of Islam”�Said ����：���is 
that“the absence in America either of a colonial past or of a long-standing cultural attention to 
Islam makes the current obsession all the more peculiar, more abstract, more secondhand”�Said 
����：���．It is curious that the lack of a colonial past makes American attention more abstract 
and second hand�and so more distant from some reality�than the European. Said is here argu�
ing that it is the reality�he uses the term“concreteness”；Said ����：���of colonialism that en�
sures a first-hand, non-abstract knowledge. This is a perverse and grotesque argument for one 
proclaiming himself as resisting American domination, and following Mills.
Beyond this, Said’s assertion that the concentration of the mass media can be said to constitute“a 
communal core of interpretation providing a certain picture of Islam and of course, reflecting powerful 
interests in the society served by the media”�emphasis added� Said ����：4��neglects the indirect 
nature of the individual’s relation to the world. The individual’s picture of Islam�or of anything 
else�is not merely‘provided’by the media. The consumers of the media’s products also inter�
pret what they receive. For example, the interpretation given to the same filmed reports of vio�
lence in the intifada by a political youth in Tustas is likely to be rather different from that of a 
conservative Zionist in New York because of their different circumstantial, structural, and dispo�
sitional conditions. Such interpretation depends on the context, culture, circumstances, and struc�
tures in which the individual is located. This radically undercuts the power that Said would as�
cribe to the providing media. Though they have types of power we have seen that power is not 
undifferentiated or unchallenged in time, context, or in relation to the media’s audience.
Said’s confusion threatens to degenerate into disingenuous, however, when he later denies that he 
asserts that one general view is expressed by the media�Said ����：4��．We have already seen 
him argue that the media provide“a certain picture of Islam”．Similarly, he denies that he implies 
a“conspiracy”or“dictatorship”�Said ����：4�-4��while we saw him assert that news and its 
presentation re�ect“powerful interests”，such as those of big business, or government policy
�Said ����：4��．
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I understand and accept that the“fact basic to any theory of interpretation or hermeneutics”
which continues“in the political or ethical or even epistemological contexts proper to it”is the 
politics of any subject of interpretation and the act of interpretation itself�Said ����：��．It is be�
cause of this that I cannot accept that the existence and power of Orientalism might be postulat�
ed in such terms and then have the subsequent formulation presented as self-evident or mani�
festly true：“patently impossible to dismiss the truth”thereof�Said ����：��．In dismissing such 
criticism and not paying enough attention to the“political or ethical or even epistemological con�
texts”of his own project, Said fundamentally weakens the power of his own analysis.
One consequence of this�which relates to our discussion of Palestinians, the intifada, and the me�
dia�is that Said’s search for‘knowledge that is non-dominative and non-coercive [and] can be 
produced in a setting that is deeply inscribed with politics... and the strategies of power”�Said 
����：��leads him to the utopian‘discovery’of a“wider and libertarian optic.”
In my framework�cf. �aim �����modes of domination persist through the three modes of knowl�
edge that are doxa, orthodoxy, and heterodoxy, and notions of non-dominative and non-coercive 
knowledge are, at least, nonsensical. This too, is the lesson of Foucault, from whom Said claims 
inspiration�Said �����and to whom he admits indebtedness�Said �����．Said’s use of ideas of 
power and knowledge is odd and at odds with Foucault’s. He proposes using Islam as a concept 
without“offensively political”accretions�Said ����：���．His methodology�see, for example, Said 
����：��-���represents a dangerous slanting of enquiry to reproduce Muslims’own ideologies 
about their faith and history rather than questioning them. As such it would be no more than an 
institutionalised mechanism for ensuring the reproduction of the established�Islamic�order and 
so obscure relations of domination therein from the grasp of individual consciousness and power
�further related criticism has been made by Warraq �����．
Importantly, Said’s postulation ignores his own determination in networks of power and knowl�
edge. This leads him to present as liberating and non-dominative the actually oppressive and en�
slaving proposition that women’s studies by women, black studies by blacks, and anti-imperialist 
studies by the victims of imperialism are relatively free of the distortions and denials of coercion 
and domination. He has, grudgingly, conceded that it is“inadmissible... that only women can un�
derstand feminine experiences, only Jews can understand Jewish suffering, only former colonial 
subjects can understand colonial experience”�Said ����：���．However, in his concern to discred�
it“essentialism and exclusiveness”he continues to overlook the common reality that the experi�
ences of all these groups and representations of those experiences by all these groups are, together 
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with those of‘the West’，equally determined by relations of power and knowledge and therefore 
are equally subject to the distortions and denials of coercion and domination from within those 
groups, experiences, and representations as to any from‘the West’，‘the mainstream’，or‘met�
ropolitan culture’．Rather than discovering a“wider and libertarian optic”Said is proposing a 
new oppression, suitably denied and obscured.
The struggle of the Palestinians in the territories challenges fundamentally Said’s notions. His cri�
tique of Orientalism amounts to a critique of a refusal by the West of the privilege of historical 
re-invention to the Orient, the Arabs, and Islam�see Said ����；����；����；����；���� and 
�������. His own approach, however, entails a similar denial of that privilege. This is because he 
neglects the historicity and power of local structures and dispositions in circumstances of con�
junction. As I have demonstrated, the Palestinian struggle and reportage of it in the‘internation�
al’mass media are integral to the historical re-invention of Palestinians both for Palestinians 
themselves and the rest of the world. Important in this is the conjunctive relation between the 
two. If, as Said asserts, the refusal of the Orientalists to extend this privilege is so powerful as to 
harness the relations of power between the‘West’and the‘Orient’to their own perpetuation 
important questions are raised. We should ask how it is that precisely when discourses and rela�
tions of power-knowledge have become truly global�and, one might be excused for thinking, bet�
ter able to resist challenge because of this�groups such as the Palestinians, blacks, women, and 
anti-imperialists�to name only those mentioned by Said�����；������could issue such challeng�
es and do so with apparent success. Of course, it is not because the nature of power and knowl�
edge has undergone radical change creating non-coercive or non-dominative forms. The space 
for challenge was always there. It is the interpretation given, in this case by Said, that is limiting. 
Fortunately for the Palestinians and other struggling groups Feyerabend is closer than Said to 
the reality of their action and experience：what matters is the subjectivity of actors, not what a 
few intellectuals declare to be real�cf. Feyerabend ����：���-����．
This analysis of Tustas is based on the idea that the inhabitants�and inhabitants in all‘locali�
ties’�are‘free’�given their structures and the dispositions of those structures�to react to the 
advance of the world system in locally specific ways. They are not mute objects whose silence 
��　Said’s later understanding and characterisation of power, its exercise, and in� uence remain, in the 
main, unchanged from those contained in Orientalism. Despite tentative formulations that metropoli�
tan culture was important to the anti-imperialist mobilisation of both the colonised and the colonis�
ing, he still falls back on the idea that Western cultural forms are repressive and effectively silence 
the Other�see Said ����：����．
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has been imposed by the West. I thus criticise Said’s picture of Western knowledge as determi�
nant of relations between Western societies and those of the rest of the world. At the same time, 
by focussing on‘the local’my approach answers Said’s criticisms of‘world history’as“universal�
ising,”“homogenising and incorporating”�Said ����：���．
This is the nub of my criticism of Said. The nature of the crisis confronting Tustasis�and the sit�
uation confronting Palestinians in the territories generally�is conjunctive. It is inter-active. To 
see it purely as a case of‘the West’�or Israel�refusing the privilege of historical reinvention to 
Palestinians undervalues the importance of the historicity of local developments, structures, and 
dispositions. To understand such realities requires a depth of content and ethnographic detail 
which allow the relation of local factors to larger forces to be taken into adequate account. Said 
does not do this.
As might be expected from his position and training as a literary critic, Said’s contribution is not 
so much in understanding the generality of power-knowledge but rather in analysis of the con�
tent of media reports as texts. From this as we read or view them we may be more aware that 
they are not simply‘information’but represent ways of viewing events and issues to which 
there are always alternatives.
I do not argue that there is no such thing as an international media culture. Neither do I argue 
against the idea that such a culture emphasises particular aspects of reality over others. In this it 
is the same as other cultures, for example that of literary critics who believe that they can mean�
ingfully study imperialism through narrative fictional literature. I have, however, already chal�
lenged the idea that the mass media present a dominating representation which silences the non-
West. Israel may equally be a‘victim’of the culture of the media and its language, though Said 
may consider it to be a part of Western‘imperialism’and its structures, which supposedly con�
trol the media in some systematic way. Indeed the reportage of the intifada by the mass media 
led to a loss of credibility and support for Israel abroad, even from“some of Israel’s most loyal 
backers”�Marshall ����：��-�4���.
��　The media’s cultural emphasis on the description of events rather than the analysis of processes, 
coupled with an exaggerated emphasis on con�ict and drama means that even without‘taking sides’
the descriptions and representations of reality that they give are neither full nor accurate. My expe�
rience of the media following the settlers’attack on the village follows this outline of these two main 
cultural biases closely. One team of reporters recorded a description of what happened, how many 
villagers were killed and how. They then‘wasted’no time in leaving when assured that no further 
violence or dramatic event was planned, but sped off to Nablus seeking‘stories’．
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The mass media have been essential in promoting Palestinians’national consciousness and en�
hancing their political mobilisation. This critically illustrates, on the national level, Palestinians’
active engagement with the media in the former’s own terms. It is not surprising, given my view 
of power and knowledge, that while dependent on foreign news sources the Palestinians are able 
to use the products of those sources for their own mobilisation, re�ecting views ranging from ac�
commodation with Israel to outright rejection, or from secular nationalism to Islamic activism. 
Palestinians are actively engaging with the mass media�and education�to provide categories of 
understanding and‘global’vocabulary for the expression of their desires and demands. It is be�
cause of this that the media can be used both to further the Palestinians’international campaign
�as the intifada undeniably did�as well as to build a nation within Palestinian society.
The nature of the crisis confronting this community and all others in the territories as inter-ac�
tive, or conjunctive, and not purely penetrative, is clear.
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